夏 传 玲 博士学位论文
指导教师：李 汉 林 答辩日期2006年6月11日
组织的权力运作模型
兼论所有制差异
内容摘要
在本次研究中，我们从权力现象开始，进入组织研究领域，通过解剖权力单子和权力的
运作机制，我们重新认识到权力的两重性：作为符号和集体行动能力的对立统一，我们把这
两重性分别称之为“权杖”和“权势”。权杖的主要属性是合法性，权势的主要属性是团结。
权势的三个机制是身份识别、身份认同和组织承诺，影响它大小的因素是群体规模、组织忠
诚和组织承诺。权杖的三个机制是权威、声望和领导，其合法性体现在秉权、授权和用权之
上。历史上，存在大量的服务于用权机制的权力技术，包括奖励制度、社会控制、主体性和
社会化。
通过打开组织结构的战略决策理论中的权力暗箱，我们发现，对应于权力的二重性，组
织也具有两个运作场，我们分别称之为“权杖场”和“权势场”，这两个场之间的联系和对
立是维持组织运作的两种力量。
权杖场的主要目标是围绕权杖而建立有效的决策机制，自然，决策权是权杖场中的核心，
而支持这一核心的三个基础是所有权、管辖权和卡理斯玛，这三个基础通过韦伯所阐述的合
法性过程，把决策权变成一种权力的运作符号。
对应于组织结构上的决策权，是组织成员个人层次的无权感，它是组织中正式权力（包
括决策权）的反向测量，是组织成员摄取权杖的期望和缺乏权杖之间差距的函数。决策权、
管辖权和组织控制，均是影响无权感的重要因素。而无权感和决策权一起影响行使弱势权的
可能性，后者是对权威的直接或间接挑战，它在组织内部所起的作用，和外部的、处于敌对
关系的权力中心的作用一样，即动摇权杖的合法性基础。制衡权不是在组织内部的权杖场中
对决策权提出挑战，而是跨越组织边界，诉诸其他权力中心，给组织的权力场施加合法性压
力。从这个意义上讲，制衡权也是权杖场通向其他权力中心的通道，是弱势权的外部功能等
价物，因而它们之间的关系是相关关系。
组织忠诚是权势场中的核心，没有组织忠诚，组织不过是一群“乌合之众”，一旦遭遇
环境变迁（如偶然性理论所强调的）、竞争压力（如组织群落理论所强调的）和合法性危机
（如社会运动理论所强调的）时，组织的发展就会出现困难，有时甚至会出现生存危机。组
织承诺试图解决组织成员最大可能投入到组织的问题，通过不断的组织承诺行为，个人对组
织的投入越来越大，他对组织忠诚也就越来越高。
权势场中的另外两个因素，人际信任和制度信任，是权势场和权杖场之间的通道，人际
信任解决的问题是给予授权机制以行动支持，制度信任解决的问题是给予秉权机制以行动支
持，没有这两个通道，用权机制就成为无源之水，无本之木，没有这两种信任基础，任何权
力技术都将失效。可见，人际信任、制度信任和组织承诺三者之间为相关关系，它们共同影
响组织忠诚。
我们把上述理论模型转换成一个结构方程模型，通过对上海、广州、成都、兰州、南宁、
沈阳等6 个城市1912 个在不同所有制中工作的成年人的抽样调查数据，进行了多组结构方
程模型的拟合，分析显示，调查数据支持理论模型。同时，我们还就影响决策权、无权感、
卡理斯玛、制衡权、管辖权、弱势权、组织忠诚、组织承诺、制度信任、人际信任和社会分
层效应等11 方面的因素进行了多组线性回归分析或对数概率模型分析，结果表明，不同所
有制类型的组织，在权力运作的机制和效应上，至少是同构的制度安排，在某些方面，甚至
是镜像的制度格局，这表明，在权力运作上，它们之间的差异在于系统的状态层次上，而不
是在系统的结构参数上。所有制研究应更多关注合法性而不是组织绩效。
关键词：
权力、组织、所有制、权力的二重性、无权感、决策权、弱势力、制度信任、人际信任、组
织忠诚、组织承诺
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Abstract
The study begins at reviews of the studies of definition and theory of power, and then turns
into the fields of organization research. The concept of duality of power emerged as dialectic
relationship between power symbols and collective actions, in the process of analysis of power
dyad and mechanisms of power operations. Those two aspects are termed as symbolism and
agency of power, defined as symbolic-generalized communication media by Niklas Luhmann
and as actions in concert by Hannah Arendt. Power symbolism concerns about the legitimacy,
while power agency concerns about solidarity. There are three kinds of mechanisms for power
symbolism, i.e., identity recognition, group identification and organizational commitment.
Correspondingly, the volume of power agency is the function of group size, organizational
loyalty and organizational commitment. And the three mechanisms of power symbolism is
authority, prestige and leadership, its legitimacy is represented in symbolism, empowerment and
enactment. There are many historically established power techniques, for example, positive and
negative sanctions, social control, subjectivism and socialization.
By opening the black-box of power in the theory of strategic choice of organizational
structure, we found the congruence between duality of power and operative fields of organization,
which are power symbolism field and power agency field respectively, and those two fields are
integrated and opposite forces operated in organizations
The core of the power symbolism field, aimed at building an effective and efficient
decision-making mechanisms, is the power to making decisions, supported by property ownership
rights, supervision and charisma. Those three bases, through the legitimation processes specified
by Max Weber, transform the decision-making power into an operative symbolism of power.
Powerlessness in individual level is related to the decision-making power in organizational
level, therefore, it is a reverse measurement of formal power in organizations, e.g.,
decision-making power, a function of difference between expectation of acquisition of power
symbolism and its failures. Decision-making power, supervision power and organizational control
are factors which will change the levels of powerlessness of members in organizations. Moreover,
powerlessness and decision-making power change the probability of use of counter-power,
which is the direct or indirect challenge to formal authority in organization. Counter-power
functions inside as a functionally equivalent of a hostile power outside the organization, and it
plays the same role of a threat to legitimacy of power symbols. In contrast, countervailing power
challenges the decision-making power by the legitimacy pressure, not inside the internal
symbolism field of power but cross the organizational boundaries to other powers in environment.
Therefore, countervailing power functions as the tunnel leading the power symbol to other powers
in environment, it is the functional equivalent of counter-power and correlates with each other.
Without organizational loyalty, the focus of the power agency field, organization would be
transformed from the organized into a mass of unorganized mobs, from development to struggle
for survival, when the environmental changes (predicted by contingency theory), competition
pressure (predicted by organization population theory) and legitimacy crisis (predicted by social
movement theory) have happened. Organizational commitment functions as a solution to the
problem of maximization of involvement of members, the more commitment, the more investment
of members into organization, the higher level of his or her allegiance to organization.
Other two factors in power agency field, personal trust and institutional trust, are channels
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between power agency field and power symbol field. Personal trust supports empowerment
mechanism, institutional trust supports symbolism mechanism, enactment will be impossible
without them, any enactment will not effective without them. Personal trust, institutional trust and
organizational commitment correlate with each other, and affect organizational loyalty together.
These theoretical models are specified as a structural equation model and estimated by a
multiple group comparison using the survey data of 1912 cases, conducted in Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Nanning and Shenyang, China, 2005. The data support our power
operation model of organization. Meanwhile, the multiple group regression models or logit models
of decision-making power, powerlessness, charisma, countervailing power, supervision power,
counter-power, organizational commitment, institutional trust, personal trust, and social
stratification are estimated. The results indicate the institutional congruence, or even institutional
mirror-images among private organizations, shareholder organizations, SOEs, and administration
organizations in terms of operative mechanisms of power and their effects. The conclusion is that
different types of ownership differ in state parameters of the system, not in structural parameters in
the operations of power. The research of ownership should focus on legitimacy instead of
performance of organization.
Keywords：
power, organization, ownership, duality of power, powerlessness, decision-making power,
counter-power, institutional trust, personal trust, organizational loyalty, organizational
commitment
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目录
一、选题意义...1
二、理论综述...3
三、研究思路和研究假设.............................................................................................................48
四、不同所有制的组织属性.........................................................................................................57
五、所有制和决策权.....................................................................................................................71
六、所有制和无权感.....................................................................................................................90
七、所有制和卡理斯玛...............................................................................................................107
八、所有制和制衡权...................................................................................................................116
九、所有制和管辖权...................................................................................................................125
十、所有制和弱势权...................................................................................................................135
十一、所有制和组织忠诚...........................................................................................................149
十二、所有制和组织承诺...........................................................................................................177
十三、所有制和制度信任...........................................................................................................205
十四、所有制和人际信任...........................................................................................................231
十五、权杖和权势.......................................................................................................................261
十六、权力和收入分层...............................................................................................................269
十七、结论和讨论.......................................................................................................................282
致谢...............286
参考文献.......287
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图示目录
图1 上下级关系的LMX 模型图示.......................................................................................33
图2 组织结构的战略选择图示...........................................................................................43
图3 组织的权杖场图示.......................................................................................................44
图4 组织的权势场图示.......................................................................................................45
图5 定量研究的框架示意图................................................................................................48
图6 制度等价的分类示意图................................................................................................51
图7 决策权量表的证实性因子分析...................................................................................71
图8 资历量表的证实性因子分析.......................................................................................77
图9 无权感量表的证实性因子分析...................................................................................91
图10 弱势权的证实性因子分析.......................................................................................136
图11 组织忠诚量表的证实性因子分析...........................................................................150
图12 组织承诺的证实性因子分析...................................................................................179
图13 制度信任的证实性因子分析...................................................................................205
图14 人际信任的证实性因子分析...................................................................................233
图15 组织的权杖场图示...................................................................................................263
图16 组织的权势场图示...................................................................................................266
图17 组织的权势场（分所有制）图示...........................................................................268
图18 月收入自然对数在样本中的分布示意图................................................................269
图19 利益取向量表的证实性因子分析模型示意图........................................................270
